One of the most enduring questions in corporate governance is how corporations decide on the redistribution of economic rents. Focusing on a corporation that operated in early modern capitalism, this paper analyzes nearly 200 years of dividend policy at the Dutch East India Company (VOC). The main empirical finding is that the concentration of corporate ownership contributed to the stabilization of dividend payouts and formalization of corporate governance and not to rentseeking behavior, as agency theory predicts. The reason is that the Company's largest shareholders and directors were not part of the same elite: the directors' constituencies tried to keep shareholder influence to a minimum, while the large shareholders criticized the lack of procedure at the VOC. Our study contributes to agency theory by relaxing the often-made assumption that the coordination between shareholders and managers of closely held firms is smooth. Especially in developing or suspect economies, where rational economic action cannot fully have its way, closely held firms cannot always be considered low agency cost environments. It is when dominant shareholders engage in the minimization of agency cost that they push for stable corporate governance and as such become important drivers of capitalist institutionalization.
INTRODUCTION
Corporations make up a large part of the economy in modern societies (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2008) . Hence, any deviation from value-maximization as a result of defunct corporate governance presents huge public costs. One of the strongest and most observable signals of agency problems between shareholders and management is the annual dividend (Easterbrook, 1984; DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Skinner, 2009; Pindado, Riquero & De la Torre, 2012) . Consequently, one of the key determinants of modern corporate governance is whether the rents of past activity are reinvested or paid out to shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes & Vishny, 2000; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003) . Since the severity of agency conflicts is associated with corporate ownership (Michaely & Roberts, 2012) , it is not surprising that the constellation of a firm's shareholders appears to affect the payout of corporate dividends (Gugler, 2003; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2007) .
Research on the dynamics between different corporate owners commonly suggests that dominant shareholders are prone to invest the firm's capital in suboptimal projects (Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung, 2005) . Therefore, they are generally believed to pervert the capital market, reduce firm value and hamper innovation and economic growth (Gompers, Kovner & Lerner, 2009 ). This conjecture rests upon a body of literature that assesses the firm's ownership structure as a determinant of corporate dividends. Because the degree of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders is assumed to decline when ownership concentration increases (Dewenter & Warther, 1998; Chemmanur, He, Hu and Liu, 2007) , several authors (e.g. Barclay, Holderness, & Sheehan, 2009; Farinha, 2003; Short, Zhang, & Keasey, 2002) have argued that managers of strongly held firms are less likely to use dividends to convey stability and credibility, which leads to more erratic dividends.
Even though the above facts are well established, there have been recent calls to push agency theory forward. For example, Michaely and Roberts (2006) have identified the need for deeper understanding of the economic mechanism that underlies dividend payout patterns.
On top of that, Knyazeva (2008) has asserted that the intertemporal patterns in dividends remain an unresolved issue. Indeed, in its current state, extant research on corporate ownership in relation to corporate governance pays scant attention to the meaning and value attached to economic resources by their beneficiaries. Especially when considered from a long-term perspective, the perceived value of corporate ownership could be multifaceted.
Needless to say, paid dividends represent a direct source of value for (regular) shareholders and a burden to management and associated dominant owners, limiting their degrees of freedom. However, value from dividends can also be derived indirectly through stock value, which is a reflection of (expected) future income. It is quite imaginable that both sources of value affect the way dominant shareholders use their position.
This raises the question what influence shareholder dominance has on the stability of corporate governance. This paper therefore aims to connect a fundamental structural property of corporations, ownership concentration, to a key corporate governance outcome: the payout of dividends. This effort is undertaken with the aim of answering the following research
question: (how) do dominant corporate owners affect a firm's dividend payout pattern?
Because prior research has involved such a wide array of theoretical perspectives to explain the morphology and significance of dividend policies, Braggion & Moore (2011) have stated that their relative importance is hard to disentangle. In order to establish a strong focus on the agency involved in dividend setting, the context for the present analysis is the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie -VOC), which existed from 1602 until 1796. This company, operating at the dawn of financial capitalism, was among the first ever to issue shares and award dividends. As such, it did not face the institutional and legal complexity that characterizes the current corporate world and so its dividends were less 'contaminated' by considerations other than the agency within the upper echelons.
THEORY

Dividends as a signal of corporate governance
The payment of dividends by corporations is one of the most observable corporate governance mechanisms. Although Miller and Modigliani (1961) have argued that dividend payments should be irrelevant for value-maximizing investors, dividends are commonly believed to provide information about the firm's future prospect (e.g. Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller & Rock, 1985) . As such, they are likely to trigger a response from the shareholders (Knyazeva, 2008 ). What's more, in a corporate world where management executives have access to resources and information that shareholders do not possess (Lau & Wu, 2010) , the dividend policy is a prime instrument used by corporations to allay agency problems (Easterbrook, 1984; DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Skinner, 2009; Pindado, Requejo & De la Torre, 2012) . A large stream of research has examined how and why firms distribute dividends (Ben-David, 2010 ) and indeed, both empirical (e.g. Allen & Michaely 2003) and survey evidence (Lintner 1956; Brav, Graham, Harvey & Michaely, 2005) suggests that dividends are anything but irrelevant to managers and markets and that corporate dividend policies often exhibit clear patterns (Michaely & Roberts, 2006) . Concerning these patterns, Michaely and Roberts (2006) have argued that corporations generally smooth their dividend payouts and do not often decrease them. This assertion matches with the outcome of Lintner's (1956) seminal paper that dividends are tied to longterm sustainable earnings. According to the managers he interviewed, a major motivation for smoothing is the reluctance to cut dividends. That is, managers appear to reduce dividends only when they have no other choice and increase them only when confident that future cash flows will sustain the new dividend percentage. The motivation underlying this reasoning appears to consist of two strong beliefs (Dewenter & Warther, 1998; Guttman, Kadan & Kandel, 2008) : 1) that investors put a premium on companies with stable dividends and 2) that markets penalize dividend cutters. Apart from Michaely and Robert's (2006) , Lintner's (1956) conclusions have been confirmed throughout the decades with a body of empirical and survey evidence (cf. Fama & Babiak, 1968; Brav et al, 2005) .
The agency behind dividend smoothing
Most scholars appear to view dividend smoothing as a solution to both agency conflicts and information asymmetry (cf. Aivazian, Booth & Cleary, 2006; Leary & Michaely, 2008) . In general, managers seeking a more credible dividend policy will make regular persistent dividend payments to shareholders (Ben-David, 2010) . The implication of the asymmetric information model is therefore that firms facing more uncertainty and greater information asymmetry will tend to smooth more (e.g. Kumar, 1988; Guttman et al, 2008 ). The agency model predicts that firms facing a conflict of interest will smooth more (cf. Leary & Michaely, 2011) . Michaely and Roberts (2006) have indeed reported that dividend smoothing is more pronounced in public than in private firms, because potential agency issues and information asymmetries are more pronounced there.
Ceteris paribus, weakly governed managers can expect a more adverse shareholder reaction to deviations since their investment may be less efficient in the absence of dividends (Knyazeva, 2008) . After all, for all the shareholders know, management may be tempted to use the firm's resources in a way that does not serve their best interest (Braggion & Moore, 2011) . To show that they are not destroying shareholder value, managers can uphold the promise of continued dividends (Knyazeva, 2008) , because the less cash available to management, the harder it is for them to waste it (Jensen, 1986; Ben-David, 2010) .
Furthermore, dividend payments pressure managers to raise new capital and debts to fund new investment. Managers who award dividends are therefore met with greater external monitoring, which reduces the agency conflicts between them and the firm's shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984) . Lowering agency costs generally increases the value of the firm, so managers who are under suspicion are likely to uphold the implicit dividend promise.
Conversely, managers of better-governed firms are believed to be able to deviate from the implicit dividend promise at a relatively low cost because shareholders will expect more efficient subsequent investment behavior (Knyazeva, 2008) .
According to Michaely and Roberts (2006) , empirical evidence suggests indeed that management's reluctance to cut dividends is partly driven by investors' reactions to such announcements. For example, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) have found that the consequences for dividend omissions are severe. Furthermore, according to Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) , the reactions to increases and decreases are asymmetric with average returns reacting more strongly to dividend increases than to decreases. Dewenter and Warther (1998) have examined dividend smoothing at Japanese firms that were members of a Keiretsu. Keiretsu firms typically face less agency conflicts because their shareholders usually have close ties to management (Lau & Wu, 2010) . Their results include that Keiretsu member firms pay dividends that are highly sensitive to corporate earnings. Similarly, Chemmanur et al (2007) have found that Hong Kong firms are less likely to smooth dividends than American firms. These authors attribute this result to Hong Kong firms' high degree of ownership concentration, which moderates agency conflicts.
Dividend smoothing and ownership concentration
Corporate governance is traditionally thought to evolve around an enduring agency problem that involves an agent -usually a CEO -and multiple principals -the shareholders (cf. Berle & Means, 1932) . However, several studies question the empirical relevance of the principalagent characterization. For instance, Lopez de Silanes, La Porta and Shleifer (1999) have found that shareholders with dominant equity stakes are present in most large corporations around the world, including the US (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; Holderness, 2009) . Hence, the most important topic in corporate governance might not be the traditional principal-agent problem, but the behavior of powerful corporate owners. Chemmanur et al's (2007) hypothesis about the dividend smoothing at Hong Kong firms therefore makes sense, especially when it is considered that the structure of corporate ownership explains at least a part of the observed variation in dividend policies (Gugler, 2003; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2007) .
In fact, Michaely and Roberts (2006) have conjectured that firms with higher levels of large shareholder ownership are less likely to smooth dividends. Conversely, firms with low insider ownership appear to commit more to a stable dividend policy as they attempt to alleviate the free cash flow problem (Rozeff, 1982; John & Knyazeva, 2007; Jeong, 2011) .
Supporting empirical findings include Brav et al's (2005) report on how closely held firms are much less serious about the consequences of dividend cuts and omissions. Consequently, the dividends of corporations with concentrated ownership are more likely to reflect temporary changes in earnings than those of widely held firms. In the same fashion, the agency and information asymmetry conflicts at family firms are commonly found to be lower than at regular companies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . As a result, family firms engage less in dividend smoothing (Lau & Wu, 2010; Pindado et al, 2012) .
The role of the dominant shareholder in corporate governance
The apparent consensus about the effect of ownership concentration on corporate dividend payouts matches well with the state of the art of the literature on the behavior of dominant shareholders in the corporate arena. For instance, Morck et al (2005) have listed two widely known problems between dominant shareholders and their less prominent peers: 1) interest divergence and 2) economic entrenchment. A typical manifestation of the first problem is non-value maximizing investment, for instance when the dominant shareholder is interested in 'empire building' rather than the maximization of shareholder value. Suboptimal investment decisions or the threat thereof may render the capital market suspect, reduce the supply of capital and drive up the cost of capital (Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002; Morck et al, 2005) . The second problem stems from the fact that the dominant equity stake allows its beneficiary 'tunnel' the corporation's resources around to other projects in order to maximize the performance of a private investment portfolio (Stulz, 1988) . Dominant shareholders have also often been found to lobby against legal reforms that would enhance minority rights (Morck et al, 2005) , because the value of control decreases with the potential to expropriate the minority shareholders (La Porta et al, 1999) . The selfsustaining feedback loop created by such lobbying makes oligarchic capitalism highly stable. However, the purpose to which dominant shareholders consolidate their hold on corporations remains debatable. For instance, La Porta et al (1999) have stressed that equity markets are both broader and more valuable in countries with good legal protection of minority shareholders. This would mean that the value of the dividend rights that controlling shareholders retain increases as the position of minority shareholders improves.
An important related finding is that rent-seeking and corporate decisions are mostly endogenously determined (Pedersen, 1995) . That is, rent-seeking at time t is largely determined by the policy of time t-1. The endogeneity argument transforms the coordination among principals from a 'one-shot' into a repetitive game. A core finding of game theory is that end games significantly change players' behavior in the direction of self-interest; reversing this situation might have the opposite effect for the agency between dominant and minority shareholders. While most research ascribes a destructive role to controlling shareholders, concerns regarding continuity might induce a much more constructive attitude.
By departing from the one-shot settings commonly used in analyses of agency among different corporate principals one could factor in continuity, a potentially important yet understudied goal of corporate ownership, as a part of the corporate governance mechanism.
That the role of dominant shareholders in the stabilization of corporate governance is has not been explored to the full is reflected in Berk and DeMarzo's (2007) argument that the scholars who have identified reasons why companies smooth their dividends or why shareholders prefer particular dividend payouts have not produced conclusive evidence. In this connection Braggion and Moore (2011) have stressed that the current body of knowledge on corporate dividend patterns has come to include a list of determinants as varied as tax, regulation, asymmetric information and behavioral processes. According to these authors, the analysis of dividend policy would be helped not by offering new perspectives, but by ruling out ex ante some theoretical explanations. For instance, the examination of markets where taxes were largely irrelevant and regulation was non-existent would provide a good check on the actual agency-related theories on dividend policy. Broadening this argument, the examination of dividend payouts in institutional voids or little institutionalized environments and could shed new light on the role that dominant owners take up in their coordination with management and other shareholders.
Setting the scene
Answering to the need for an empirical field that has not been thoroughly shaped by the HXVII did not operate in isolation. Interestingly, while the VOC depended on the Republic for its monopoly rights, for most of its history the States General gave the Company considerable leeway in its day-to-day management (Roos, 1987) . Instead, it faced a host of local interests (Gaastra, 1989) because the Company was deemed of huge importance to the Dutch economy.
1 In addition, shareholders and directors were often members of the same dynasty (Roos, 1987) . As a consequence, the principal shareholders were in the best position to become the next member of HXVII, so they generally took care not to obstruct HXVII and aimed to pamper their social network. As personal or elite continuity prevailed over the Company's interest (Gaastra, 1989) , the 'unconnected shareholders', while formally in indirect control over HXVII through elected hoofdparticipanten or 'principal shareholders' (Meilink-Roelofsz et al, 1992) , exerted little de facto influence (Roos, 1987) .
The Company started to pay out annual dividends from 1630 onwards. Before this year the VOC underwent a formative period during the individual chambers financed each expedition individually and separately (Schalk et al, 2012) and HXVII was unlimitedly liable (Gelderblom, De Jong & Jonker, 2012) . With the collectivization of debt in 1617 and the introduction of limited liability in 1623 the Company's leverage was significantly improved , which freed HXVII from immediate financial pressures. Figure 1 indicates that from 1630 onwards, when the Company started to pay out annual dividends, the percentages (which were based on nominal equity) were quite versatile. This pattern fits with historical descriptions that the dividend decision was marked by stark intercity tensions. 
Data collection
Data collection took place on two levels: the mesoeconomic (regional) and organizational level. On the mesoeconomic level we attended specifically to regional Dutch economic development. In order to get to the dividend data we approached the archive stepwise. First, using the VOC archive's thick catalogue the shareholder ledgers and HXVII resolutions were identified. For specific information on dividend decision-making we had to search through the points', which are indices of all the topics HXVII concerned itself with in a given period of time. The toegangen were scanned for the synonymous key words used interchangeably by VOC officials to denote dividend payments: afgifte, repartitie and uytdeelinge. With these keywords the dates of all the dividend decisions were established. With these dates the resolution texts could be looked up and recorded, along with circumstantial variables.
Analysis
The analysis of the VOC's dividend policy consisted of two branches: one focusing on the decision-making circumstances and another on the Company's ownership structure. A prime variable in the first part of the analysis is the place of convention, which was used as a proxy for the support of the presiding directors' local network. The location-effect was tested quantitatively using two ANOVAs: one that compared the dividend outcomes realized in other policy documents and economic history were analyzed at the Dutch National Archive and the Royal Library of The Hague using a snowball approach until a point of information saturation was reached. Using Eisenhardt's (1989) propositions for case study research, we systematically identified themes and quotes that guided our assessment of the examined textual material. Because the normal resolutions don't go far beyond reporting the actual decision, qualitative analysis was expanded toward the so-called minute resolutions, which are resolution drafts that contain much more background information, and general policy reports that describe the procedure according to which decisions on dividends were formed.
However, these minutes are generally quite difficult to read, which limited the extent to which HXVII boardroom discussion could be covered.
The second branch of the analysis was aimed at measuring the effect of equity ownership on the Company's dividend policy and its stability. These relationships were conceived on the basis of a qualitative analysis of Jewish history in the Dutch Republic and the VOC's financial history at the Royal Library, which once again followed a snowball approach until saturation. Principal analysis was quantitative and involved time series regression. One concern with this technique is autocorrelation of the regression residuals. Use was therefore made of Newey-West standard errors, which means that the calculation of coefficients takes this abnormality into account. Dickey-Fuller tests and normality tests of the regression residuals indicated no problem related to the effectiveness of the identified models.
Different regressions were run with different lags of the independent variables in order to better understand the impact of ownership on dividend policy.
One final pitfall that could undermine the quality of the time series regressions is the structural break. Structural breaks in the course of a dependent variable lead to an incorrect estimation of the regression coefficients, because whenever there is a structural break, two separate coefficients for the two periods are more accurate than one coefficient for the total period. Because the development of the Company's dividends underwent a striking change from the 17-th to the 18-th century the presence of this problem had to be determined. The presence of a structural break was tested using a rupture point identified as the year 1703, which is the start of the first period of dividend stability. The Chow statistic was calculated in order to test the assumption that the two estimates for the pre and post 1703 period were not statistically different. With a Chow statistic of 1.921 the structural break test was insignificant. This means that a model covering years prior to and since the dividend smoothing can be assumed accurate.
RENT DISTRIBUTION AT THE VOC
17-th century: two cities, two rationalities
Regional particularism stood at the cradle of the Company, which shows in the way trade was initially organized and financed (Schalk et al, 2012 (Roos, 1987) , Zeeland was never quite able to build an infrastructure conducive to economic growth. Where trade did succeed, for instance in shipping, it was occasionally disrupted by war (Enthoven, 1996) . In this context industry was led by small artisanship, which presented little opportunity for long-term investment (Enthoven, 1996) . This promulgated a preference for short-term economic transactions, which shows for instance in how the province's first Oriental trade expeditions were organized.
Commercial expeditions lasted only as long as a single round-trip journey and all the associated assets would be liquidated upon return in Europe (Roos, 1987) .
On the other hand, Amsterdam, one of the rebellions' strongholds in the Dutch strife for independence, was a city marked by tolerance and freedom. Having grown into the country's wealthiest city since the independence from Spain, Amsterdam attracted numerous immigrants of a mercantile disposition from Southern Europe, including many Iberian Jews (Sephardim) and French Calvinists (Bloom, 1931; Padgett, 2011) . These groups saw in the As a result, investors soon started to care about the signaling effect of the Company's dividends, rather than about the percentages per se (cf. Petram, 2011) .
The schism between Zeeland's 'communal' and Amsterdam's 'commercial' thinking surfaces in the location effect that shaped the VOC's dividend decisions in the 17-th century.
It is unlikely that regional economic developments brought change to this contrast. Figure 2 juxtaposes the public revenues of Zeeland and the Northern Quarter of Holland (Amsterdam's hinterland). Because taxes were raised primarily on the basis of economic transactions, figure   2 suggests that the two economies were diverging: starting from similar points, Holland's income developed linearly (the spikes are attributable to military events that required exceptional non-tax fundraising), while Zeeland's income stagnated. This supports Petram's (2011) suggestion that over the course of the 17-th century Amsterdam began to break loose from the rest of the Republic. For a Company rooted in society this economic divergence is likely to have aggravated regional heterogeneity, if anything.
Figure 2 about here
18-th century: smoothing policy
However, the location effect on the Company's dividend policy did not endure. Table 2 (Appendix) shows a century-based ANOVA that clearly demonstrates a shift in dividend policy from the 17-th to the 18-th century. The standard deviation of the dividend percentages drops from 33.343 in the 17-th century to 8.319 in the 18-th and the percentages themselves also drop by almost 10 percentage points. Furthermore, where in the 17-th century it took HXVII an average of more than 18 days to reach a decision on the dividend for that year, it shrunk to almost 11 in the 18-th century. The time to effectuation dropped from nearly 80 days to nearly 50. Table 1 indicates that in this context all the intercity differences of the 17-th century disappear in the 18-th. In fact, time to effectuation becomes longer for Zeeland than for Amsterdam, which contradicts Zeeland's image of a short-term oriented region.
The nature of the change in the dividend-related variables indicates that the Amsterdam's commercial rationality largely but not completely took the upper hand. Instead, they seem to fit with a policy aimed at sending a signal of robustness to shareholders (cf. Van Zanden, 1996) . In this connection, Willemsen's (2004) analysis of the VOC's dividend policy concludes that some form of rationalization took place. His findings include an average dividend yield of 3.37 and P/E-ratio of 20.63 for the 18-th century, which are ordinary figures even according to current standards. Another of Willemsen's observations is that although the dividend payout ratio (the proportion of profit spent on dividends) cumulatively remains around 100 percent over the 18-th century, it was realized over a long period of time instead
of on a year-to-year basis like in the 17-century. This suggests that dividends became less reactive to the immediate interests of the VOC's chambers, but shareholder interests were never ignored. Instead, the 18-th century dividends seem to reflect a policy aimed at keeping the market value of share capital stable, which might be explained by the competition from government bonds that the Company faced on the capital market (Van Zanden, 1996) .
It remains dubious however why the dividends stabilized, because strictly speaking HXVII had no economic interest in a stable stock course (Van Zanden, 1996) . Indeed, with its orientation toward the signaling function of financial decisions, the shift served a clearly identifiable but latent 'third' party: the investors on the Amsterdam financial market. This suggests a rise of agency problems between shareholders and directors, which merits a look at how the VOC's ownership developed across the turn of the 18-th century. Interestingly, the VOC's ownership structure changed markedly over the years. This process started in Amsterdam, where throughout the 17-th century Portuguese Sephardic Jews took increasing ownership of the Amsterdam chamber (Smith, 1919; Bloom, 1931) . While in 1602 there were only two Jewish shareholders with relatively low investments (Wätjen, 1914) , by the 1650s the Sephardim controlled a 'good part' of VOC equity (Ben Israel, 1655) . Around the turn of the 18-th century a quarter of all Amsterdam VOC shares was Jewish (Wätjen, 1914) .
The Sephardim formed an extended international network, which gave them an information advantage (Willemsen, 2004 ) that profoundly changed trade at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (Smith, 1919) . At the same time, due to their exclusion from many economic sectors, the Jews were perhaps more than anyone else dependent upon securities as a means to manage their capital (Willemsen, 2004) . On top of that, a long history of blame and expropriation had galvanized a strong Sephardic interest in impersonal types of economic transaction (Bloom, 1931) . Because unregulated markets with unknown parties were considered risky, the influential Jews of Amsterdam actively pursued market regulation (Bloom, 1931) . The best-known example is a document issued on 20 April 1739, when a collectivity of 32 prominent traders (among which 22 Jews) issued regulations for securities trade. They were supposed to prevent misunderstanding and conflict and offer protection against fraud. The document also shows that by the 18-th century the Sephardim controlled securities trade in Amsterdam (Smith, 1919) . In order to determine whether the rise of Jewish ownership of the VOC in this chamber was of influence on the Company's dividends, time series regressions were performed using two dependent variables: the dividend percentage and dividend stability, measured as a 10-year moving standard deviation. Table 3 Company's profit and average stock course -two variables traditionally closely associated with dividends -both positively increased the amount of dividend awarded. Both findings make sense: more profit meant more room to award dividends and share prices usually anticipate expected or announced future dividend payouts. Another observed effect is the negative effect of the bills of exchange: where the Company received funds in Asia, it had to pay them back in the metropolis, which lowered the capital available to pay out dividends.
The effect of the bills of exchange is immediate, but the other variables retain their power when lags of one and two years are assumed. The addition of ownership variables in the second and third models changes little to the regressions in the first models, which indicates that agency is unlikely to have affected the dividend payouts.
The story is different for the dividend's standard deviation. Depicted in figure 7 , it follows neatly the development of the number of shareholders in Zeeland (figure 4) and is horizontally symmetrical to the total Jewish share in Zeeland (figure 3). Table 4 The word 'forming' in this sense clearly suggests the presence of a Jewish agenda in Zeeland.
The word 'smausen' carries an anti-Semitic element. Even though the Dutch merchants were practical, latent racism may have fueled a collective effort to keep the Sephardim 'at bay'. If this is so, it is unlikely that the Sephardim were in the position to successfully pursue any political agenda. However, official communications surrounding the same election offer an additional perspective on the development among Zeeland's shareholders. In the below excerpt, the head participants appear to have requested the candidates to take the oath that corresponded to their position -something that had been skipped somehow the previous forty years. 10 The head participants, by this time representing a much more concentrated collective of shareholders, insisted on protocol and wanted to formalize procedures that had become informal during times when ownership was still diffuse. Furthermore, the head participants insist on the general importance of following the majority of shareholder votes and of putting shareholder interest first instead of elite interest.
Now that the matter has been brought so much out of its whole, and only to let the minority prevail over the majority and one head participant over another, this does not resemble justice and will be in its whole with discussion (…) in order to examine the reasons why the mentioned oath has never been done before and whether it serves the interest of Zeeland's shareholders (…) to introduce such a change. (…) (T)he head participants decided that it resembles neither the interest of Zeeland's shareholders nor justice to treat this matter so arbitrarily and according to the currently seeming interests and requested to proceed with this act according to old tradition, retaining the usual direction.
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In all, the head participants attempted to promote good quality corporate governance aimed at minimizing agency costs. The pamphlet was signed by as many as 31 people and with the help of Elias' (1963 ) Vroedschap van Amsterdam (1578 -1795 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In the 17-th century the VOC's dividends were largely the result of intercity negotiations. which is an alternative strategy for yielding longstanding benefits. To illustrate, when it comes to family firms, where many dominant owners can be found, agency theory generally ascribes positive effects, including continuity, to strong family ownership (cf. Randøy & Goel, 2003) . However, the literature also associates family dominance with whimsical dividend payouts, which is not in concordance with this study's findings.
The key to explaining why the VOC's 18-th century dividend pattern does not follow the predictions of agency theory is that family firms are generally considered low agency cost environments (Siebels & Zu Knyphausen Aufseß, 2012; Pindado et al, 2012) . The same goes for narrowly held corporations: dominant shareholders are typically predicted to engage in rent-seeking and entrenchment because the smoothness of coordination between management and dominant shareholders is generally taken for granted. For instance, Morck et al (2005) have described nepotism at corporate boards as a result of intervention by dominant shareholders. When agency costs are low, management and dominant shareholders do not have to take into account the effect of their coordination on outsider perceptions, which leaves them with the freedom to pay out dividends at will.
However, in economies with nascent or weak economic institutions, where legal frameworks are relatively undeveloped and informal economic ties paramount, the agency cost associated with the coordination between management and dominant shareholders are not necessarily low. For instance, shareholders may be confronted with a stubborn managerial elite that is more interested in catering to its traditional constituency than in maximizing shareholder wealth, not to mention all the informal customs, traditions and practices that have little to do with rational decision-making but still shape corporate governance. This would leave a majority shareholder with little de facto influence. Especially at the upper echelons of large prestigious corporations, where 'traditional' societal elites are likely to be active, social networks may disturb rational economic thinking. When they do, they drive up agency cost considerably, especially when the control of equity is newly acquired and the dominant shareholder is weakly socially embedded. In that case, dominant shareholders may prefer fostering stability of corporate governance to the exploitation of corporate financial resources in order to lower their agency cost.
As economies develop and the opportunities on financial markets grow, investors typically develop more long-term strategies because risks can be better hedged against.
However, when the economy is not yet back by fully developed supportive systems, such as a comprehensive and effective legal framework, the transaction costs flowing from market trade may be considerable. In their effort to mitigate these costs, many long-term oriented investors, especially the Sephardim, maintained property in the form of VOC stock over many years (Willemsen, 2004) , which gave them an interest in the continuation of the Company. This choice is not strange because the VOC was very large and government-chartered and so carried a low risk of failure. However, capitalism in the Dutch Republic was still developing and socially rooted economic mechanisms were still present. The source material presented in this paper suggests that the VOC's dominant owners, represented by Zeeland's head participants, were not on a good footing with the chamber's directors. Management did not inform shareholders timely and sufficiently and together with its traditional constituency it attempted to block the influence of the new dominant shareholders. In this context it made perfect sense for the Amsterdam investors to insist on stability to make sure that, as Zeeland's head participants have put it, the invested capital is employed well.
As this paper has shown, the remarkable stabilization of the VOC's dividends in the 18-th century is a manifestation of the role that dominant shareholders can play when the institutions guiding the economic process are not fully crystallized. As such, the Company's financial history serves as a mirror to a corporate world that is currently fraught with a renewed distrust of capitalism's institutions. 'Immoral' rent-seeking by corporate elites currently receives a lot of media coverage, which suggests that the coordination between principals and agents remains an ever-present economic problem. In addition, in a globalizing world where emerging economies are taking up new economic significance, this study's findings hint at the importance of dominant shareholders in the development of capitalism. As such, this study forms a starting point for further enquiry into the role of dominant, resourcerich parties in the institutionalization of economic processes. This might in turn lead to a reassessment of what the corporate balance of power should look like.
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